POLICY ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS IN RELATION TO U.S. AGRICULTURE by Mutti, John
POLICY ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL FLOWS
IN RELATION  TO U.S.  AGRICULTURE
John Mutti
Grinnell College
Billions  of dollars  change  hands  daily  in international  currency
transactions.  The  burgeoning  size  of this  market  and the  develop-
ment of new financial instruments have been part of the rapid expan-
sion of the financial  sector over the last decade.  However,  while the
magnitude of this activity has received  much public  attention,  the
international financial flows most relevant to U.S. agriculture are of
another type.
Gross purchases and sales of dollars easily mount into the trillions
each year, and will continue to do so regardless of whether the U.S.
balance  of payments  is positive or negative  or whether the value of
the U.S. dollar rises or falls. Of key interest to agriculture  and other
sectors that produce  internationally traded  goods is the prospect for
changes in net capital flows and the consequent impact on the inter-
national value  of the dollar.
International Capital Flows,  Value of the Dollar and
Competitiveness  of U.S.  Agriculture
Economists view the  value  of the  dollar  as being determined  by
supply  and  demand  in the  dollar  market.  There  will be a  greater
demand for dollars when foreigners want to acquire U.S.  goods,  ser-
vices  and  assets.  There  will  be  a  greater  supply  of  dollars  when
Americans  want to acquire  foreign  goods,  services  and  assets.  For
example,  when there  is a crop failure  abroad and U.S.  agricultural
sales  rise,  foreign  buyers increase  the demand  for  dollars  and, all
else equal, drive up their value. Correspondingly, if foreigners choose
to buy more U.S. farmland, again the demand for dollars rises inter-
nationally and their value will rise.
More typically,  the opposite direction  of causation is assumed.  In-
stead of U.S.  agriculture's  fortunes  driving  the value  of the  dollar,
changes in the value of the dollar are seen as driving the outlook for
U.S.  agriculture. Because agricultural transactions  account for a rel-
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work is a natural one  to adopt.  Therefore,  attention will be focused
primarily  on  other factors  determining  the  value  of the  dollar,  fol-
lowed by  some commentary  on the consequences  of dollar deprecia-
tion for U.S.  agriculture.
This discussion provides the background appropriate for evaluating
the types of policy changes that might alter the current flow of capi-
tal in the United States.
An Accounting  Framework
Two types of accounting  relationships are often used in summariz-
ing transactions that influence the value of the dollar. One is balance
of payments data,  which presents a composite  view  of international
purchases  and  sales  of goods,  services  and  assets,  and which  also
indicates the extent of Central Bank intervention in determining the
value of the nation's currency. The other type of data is from national
income  accounts,  which can  be  used to show national production  of
goods and services  compared  to national demand for goods and ser-
vices,  the  difference  being  accounted  for  by  international  capital
flows.  The latter approach  is adopted here.
A key relationship  is summarized  by the following condition:
X-M= S - I  +  T-G
where  X is exports  of goods and services,  M is imports of goods and
services, S is private saving by individuals and business, I is private
investment,  T is taxes and other government receipts,  and G is gov-
ernment expenditure  on goods and services.
The left hand side  of the equation is the international balance on
goods and services,  a concept  very close to the current account bal-
ance; in the case  of U.S.  statistics the two will  differ primarily be-
cause the former  measure  ignores  public  debt  service  payments  to
foreigners, while the latter measure  includes it. For the sake of sim-
plicity, all future references  here will be to the current account bal-
ance as X - M.
A  negative  current  account  balance  shows  that  a  country  buys
more than it produces.  If the United States runs a current account
deficit,  foreigners  as  a  group  must run  current  account  surpluses.
The  surpluses  allow  them to  acquire  dollars  in  order  to buy  U.S.
assets and IOUs, which in turn are being sold by the United States to
finance  the  purchase  of extra  goods  and  services  internationally.
Thus,  what  appears  to  be  a relationship  regarding  international
trade  simultaneously  represents  a  relationship  regarding  interna-
tional capital  flows.  U.S.  bonds,  stocks and  real estate  are  sold to
foreigners,  or  foreigners  pay off past debts  to U.S.  lenders and buy
out U.S. owners  of operations  in their countries,  using dollars they
have earned by selling goods and services to Americans. In 1986 this
82net capital  inflow represented 3.5  percent of gross national  product
(Council  of Economic  Advisers).
The terms on the right hand side of the equation indicate why this
net sale of assets occurs. The first two terms show net private saving
and the next two  terms  show net public saving.  When private  plus
net public  saving is less than domestic investment,  the current level
of private  spending  on new  machines,  factories  and houses,  and/or
the  same  level  of government  spending,  can be  maintained  only  if
foreigners find it attractive  to provide  the financing.  Otherwise,  in-
terest rates would be higher and choke off some of this spending. U.S.
experience  in  the  1980s has been  that private  saving has  slightly
exceeded private investment,  with the exception  of 1986, but public
saving has turned sharply negative. In 1986 the former figure repre-
sented -0.1 percent of gross national product (GNP), while the latter
figure was -3.4 percent (Council of Economic Advisers).
The  condition  shown  above  also is  a useful  reminder  of the link
between  international trade conditions  and other macroeconomic  re-
lationships.  Steps  to  solve  the  current  account  imbalance,  either
through the negative  approach of protectionism  or the more positive
approach of trade liberalization,  are unlikely to have much aggregate
effect unless  they also alter the  underlying  saving and investment
conditions in the economy.  Otherwise, they are likely to result in an
offsetting exchange rate change.
For example,  steps to get tough  with Japanese  imports and limit
their access  to the U.S.  market mean fewer  dollars are  supplied on
international markets; the value of the dollar appreciates as a result.
Exporters and producers in  other import competing  industries that
do not benefit from this special protection will both find themselves
in a less competitive position than previously. Agricultural  producers
dependent on open markets internationally have long recognized this
relationship,  and they have been some  of the few voices to testify in
Congress against protective  measures.
Exchange  Rate Changes and U.S.  Agriculture
Changes  in the value  of the  dollar  are  an important  element  in
determining  the  demand  for  U.S.  agricultural  commodities.  Al-
though foreign government intervention (exemplified by quantitative
import restrictions in consuming countries or competitive export sub-
sidies in other producing countries) is extensive in many agricultural
markets, the demand for U.S. exports appears to be price elastic even
for relatively restricted commodities  such as wheat.
Of course,  even when  demand  is responsive  to  changes  in prices
and  exchange  rates,  U.S.  export  sales  will  not increase  unless  the
price changes and currency depreciations affect the markets in which
U.S.  agricultural  exports  are  sold.  Measures  of dollar depreciation
based on trade among industrialized countries overstate the extent of
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benstott and  Henneberry).  Nevertheless,  some  decline  has occurred
and more  appears likely. Thus,  for a given level of income in foreign
markets,  dollar  depreciation  should  result  in  more than  a  hollow
promise of greater agricultural exports.
However,  depreciation  of the U.S. dollar to the level that prevailed
at the end of the 1970s will not recreate the world agricultural mar-
ket of that era.  The  strong growth  in per capita  income  that  took
place in the 1970s among developing countries has not been matched
by comparable growth in the 1980s. Resolution of the Less Developed
Country (LDC) debt crisis, and the potential relaxation  of financial
stringency  imposed  in many importing countries,  will be an impor-
tant step in reviving U.S. export sales, quite independently from dol-
lar depreciation.
Also,  if foreign  governments  choose  to  subsidize  their exports  to
dispose of surpluses, U.S. exports may not rebound to previous levels.
Steps to  influence  the value  of the  dollar  may  be  more  subject  to
control by  U.S. policy makers than are the ag production and trade
policies  of other countries.  Therefore,  ways of affecting the value  of
the dollar, and the role of international capital  flows in this process,
are evaluated  in the remainder of this paper.
Policy  Choices  Affecting  the Net Inflow of Capital
Tighten Monetary Policy
One way to reduce  capital inflows  into the United States  is to re-
duce the attractiveness of investment here.  Tighter monetary policy,
driving up interest rates, would push the economy  in this direction.
In  turn,  a  decline  in  income  would  result  in  fewer  imports  and a
decline  in the current  account deficit.  The opposite  relationship,  of
strong U.S. growth drawing more imports into the economy,  has been
an important  reason for the persistence  of the U.S. deficit.  However,
higher interest  rates also attract foreign  investment and if that re-
sponse  is particularly  large,  dollar  appreciation  may  offset the ten-
dency  for  the  current  account  deficit  to  fall.  Also,  debt  service
payments to foreign  lenders will rise, a factor  that shows  up as an
import of services and reduces the tendency  for the current account
deficit to fall. Although the net effect cannot be predicted a priori,  it
is worth noting that the last U.S. merchandise trade surplus occurred
in 1975,  a year of economic  recession.
Regardless of whether the capital  inflow  declines, the high cost of
retarding investment and throwing the economy into a recession may
cause  a politician to conclude  that the potential  cure is worse than
the  disease;  that strategy  did  not result in a pleasant outcome  for
Gerald Ford.
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A  more commonly  suggested  means of reducing the incentive  for
large foreign  capital inflows  is for the U.S.  government to increase
net public saving by reducing its large budget deficit. In terms of the
symbols  used above,  a reduction  in government  spending or an  in-
crease in taxes would imply a smaller net demand for loanable funds
by the government. With smaller demands on available credit, inter-
est rates would decline and the value of the dollar would depreciate.
The  opposite  sequence  of events was observed  in the  1980s  as the
dollar appreciated.
This  recent record has differed from earlier experience  with large
budget  deficits  when  economists  observed  declines  in  interest-
sensitive  items  such  as  business  investment,  inventory  accumula-
tion, home construction and purchases  of consumer durables such as
autos and appliances.  Instead, large budget deficits in the 1980s led
to a large inflow of foreign funds, an outcome attributable in part to
the  liberalization  of  Japanese  financial  regulations  that  allowed
their insurance  companies  and other  intermediaries  to acquire  for-
eign assets. As a result, interest rates did not rise as much as they
otherwise  would have.  Rather than interest-sensitive  sectors  being
crowded out by government  expansion,  the foreign trade sector was
crowded out by the appreciation of the dollar.
Just as that crowding out meant that the stimulative effect of the
large  federal  budget deficit  was  diluted,  a reduction  in the budget
deficit  would not  necessarily  imply  a large contraction  in  U.S.  eco-
nomic  activity.  Instead,  the  contraction  from  a cutback  in govern-
ment spending,  or from a reduction in investment or consumption as
taxes  were  raised,  would be  offset in part by  an expansion  of the
foreign trade sector. However, a change in fiscal policy alone would be
unlikely to achieve domestic and international policy goals simulta-
neously. Coordination  of less restrictive monetary policy would most
likely be necessary at the same time if a decline in economic activity
were not to occur.
Unfortunately,  the first step in this sequence  of reducing the gov-
ernment budget deficit has not proven very attractive politically. Fed-
eral  government  spending  has  grown  as  a share  of gross  national
product to nearly 24 percent, while net receipts of the federal govern-
ment have  remained  fairly  stable at 18.5  percent  (Council  of Eco-
nomic  Advisers).  The  budget  impasse  of the  summer  of  1987  has
centered on the willingness of the administration to accept the prin-
ciple  of higher  taxation,  together with  cuts in  defense  and nonde-
fense spending. A key issue of contention in reaching a compromise is
the Reagan administration  scepticism that raising taxes will actu-
ally reduce the deficit rather than allow a further expansion of gov-
ernment spending.
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Congress both include budget gimmickry,  especially with respect to
the treatment  of asset sales.  Auctioning off loan portfolios  or selling
government  facilities  may  generate  higher  government  revenue  in
the current year, but not in succeeding  years. If the government uses
the same facilities in the future, but must rent them back from the
private  sector,  then  the one year  gain  in  revenue  is  an  even  more
misleading indicator of whether the government's claim on resources
in the economy, and demand for loanable funds, is likely to decline in
the future.
Some commentators argue that whether the deficit is cut is merely
a side issue compared to the central question of how large a govern-
ment  sector the nation wants.  An even  more  doctrinaire  version of
this argument holds that the form  of financing,  taxation or borrow-
ing,  used to cover  government  spending,  is immaterial because  the
rational consumer will increase his private saving to cover the future
tax liability that will arise from greater current debt financing. That
response  clearly  has  not  occurred  in  the  United  States  in  recent
years, and the lack of increased domestic saving is what has provided
the incentive for foreign capital inflows.
However,  if tax increases do not come at the expense of saving, then
current consumption is likely to fall instead.  Indeed, to reduce a cur-
rent account  deficit,  wherein  the  United  States  buys more than it
produces,  will require a reduction in spending or an increase in pro-
duction while  spending remains fixed. If the economy  starts from  a
position near full employment, without a lot of excess capacity, major
production increases are not possible. Therefore, output must be redi-
rected  from the  U.S.  market  to foreign  markets. This  occurs  when
taxes  reduce  domestic  purchasing  power;  then  domestic  consumers
do not drive up prices seen by foreign buyers who will find U.S. goods
more attractive if deficit reduction results in dollar depreciation.
In 1984  voters did  not accept  Walter Mondale's  proposal  to raise
taxes, but perhaps Americans have since found that other options are
no less painful.
To  summarize,  budget  deficit  reduction  is an important,  but far
from costless,  tool to consider  in reducing  the inflow  of capital  into
the  United  States.  However,  as  other points  elaborated  below  sug-
gest,  several  other factors  will  help  determine  the  success  of this
deficit reduction strategy,  and not all of these factors may be under
the control of the U.S. government.
Encourage Saving
The  level  of taxation  is  not the  only  aspect  of fiscal  policy  that
affects the  inflow  of foreign capital.  Rather, tax measures that  en-
courage  investment in the  United  States are likely  to result  in an
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courage saving are likely to result in an outflow of capital and dollar
depreciation.
Some measures, such as the 1984 decision by the United States to
repeal  the  withholding  tax imposed  on  interest  income  earned  by
foreigners  in  the  United  States,  are  directed  specifically  at  for-
eigners.  That policy change encouraged an inflow of capital into the
United States and a consequent strengthening  of the dollar.
In terms of broader  U.S.  tax policy  changes,  legislation  in  1981
promoted investment in the United States through measures such as
the investment tax credit and accelerated  depreciation.  Those provi-
sions reduced the marginal  effective tax rate on new investment and
real  investment as a share  of GNP rose.  This  investment response
was  greater than the  response to saving incentives  included  in the
same law.
By way of contrast, the 1986 reform, in spite of the broad publicity
given to the reduction in the corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34
percent,  is estimated  to  have  increased the  marginal  effective  tax
rate on domestic investment.  The higher burden on new investment
is likely to result in a longer-run decline  in foreign capital inflows.
To treat more  completely the current  imbalance between  domestic
saving and investment, some discussion of saving incentives is appro-
priate. If such incentives  do generate greater domestic savings, they
represent  a way to reduce the net inflow of foreign capital.  Unfortu-
nately,  convincing  evidence  of their effectiveness  has  not yet been
presented,  and Canadian success with similar policies does not seem
to  be directly  applicable  to  Americans.  The  success  of any saving
incentive depends upon the extent to which additional  saving is en-
couraged in comparison with the windfall gain that accrues to saving
that would have taken place anyway.
The  1986 tax reform package  implicitly judged  against the conti-
nuation of saving incentives  such as Individual Retirement Accounts
and, instead,  favored  a general  tax rate reduction  to promote  work
effort as well as saving. A major initiative in this area does not seem
likely simply  on political  grounds.  Major tax  issues will not be re-
opened  so  soon  after  a  major  reform  has passed  and,  at the same
time, the government is attempting to raise, not reduce, revenue.
Limit Foreign Investment
Explicit  policies to limit foreign investment  in the United States
are a potential method of reducing the capital inflow. While this al-
ternative is not a general principle behind U.S. policy, U.S. interven-
tion  in  1987  to discourage  the  Japanese  firm Fujitsu's  attempt  to
acquire  Fairchild's  semiconductor  operations  from the French  firm
Schlumberger raises the possibility in more than theoretical terms.
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public  and  private  saving  and  investment  domestically,  primarily
will result in dollar depreciation. This relationship can be seen in the
policy choices facing other debtor nations such as Mexico. Refusal to
allow majority foreign ownership or reluctance to allow conversion of
debt into equity,  implies that more adjustment  must occur through
the exchange  rate. If foreigners  are allowed to buy  only goods,  but
not assets, from us, then the exchange rate must depreciate more in
order to make the goods appear sufficiently attractive.
Such  a policy  often  is defended  on  nationalistic  grounds:  foreign
control  results in economic  exploitation;  or  sales of government  as-
sets, such as petroleum  reserves, amount to selling off the wealth of
future generations.  A country's preference  for national control  is  a
plausible political choice,  but in this case it is achieved only at the
cost of a larger  currency  depreciation  and a larger increase  in the
cost of living.
Foreign Influence
The  discussion thus far has focused  on  various  concepts  seen pri-
marily from the U.S. standpoint.  Yet, similar factors operating in the
rest of the world also are relevant in determining how large a capital
inflow the United States will attract. For example,  if Japanese  and
German efforts to reduce their budget  deficits are  successful just as
the United States finally controls its budget deficit, there will be an
increased outflow of funds from those countries at the same time U.S.
borrowing requirements  are  falling. The  potential  reduction  in the
U.S. capital inflow will depend upon the alternative outlets for Japa-
nese  and  German  saving. If there  are  few  viable  alternatives,  the
U.S.  capital  inflow  may fall very  little although the  United States
will benefit from a lower interest rate.
The United States also has urged Japan and Germany to promote
faster  growth  of  their  economies  in  the  expectation  that  faster
growth will result in more attractive investment opportunities there
and draw  in more  imports  of goods. If faster growth  is accepted  by
those allies as a goal worth pursuing, the direct effect on U.S. trade
still is likely to be  small  because  the United States accounts  for  a
relatively small share of their imports. Nevertheless, greater imports
by  those  countries  would  benefit  other  countries  and help  resolve
some aspects of the LDC debt crisis.
Another factor partially outside U.S.  control is the degree of inves-
tor confidence  in the  U.S.  economy  relative  to  others.  Because  the
United States  often is regarded  as a safe  haven  in times  of unrest,
political  instability  in  debtor  nations  and  military  tension  in the
Persian  Gulf tend to cause the U.S.  dollar to strengthen.  Indecisive
U.S.  political  leadership  or  the  expectation  that the United States
will inflate its way out from under the current debt burden,  by sim-
88ply paying back in dollars that are worth much less than at present,
are  circumstances  likely  to  reduce  the  current  inflow  of  foreign
capital.  Again,  those  negative  steps  are  not  reasonable  policy
alternatives.
Expansionary Monetary Policy
The issue of U.S. inflation warrants  a further review of monetary
policy.  In addition to  1) tighter monetary  policy with no change  in
fiscal policy  and 2) tighter fiscal policy combined with more expan-
sionary  monetary  policy,  a further  alternative  is  3)  expansionary
monetary  policy with no change in fiscal policy.
Some commentators  have  recommended  that the Federal Reserve
pursue  a much more  expansionary  policy to drive down  short-term
interest rates and the value of the dollar. This approach particularly
has been advocated by those who note that real long-term returns in
the United States (the nominal interest rate less the expected rate of
inflation)  are  at historically  high  levels  exceeding  5  percent.  How-
ever,  that interpretation  assumes current rates of inflation will con-
tinue  in the  future.  Others  believe  that the  high  nominal  return
includes  an inflation  premium  to  compensate  for  an expected  in-
crease  in inflation.
The  effectiveness  of monetary  expansion  depends  in part on the
amount of slack in the economy. The unemployment rate of 6 percent
reported for July, 1987, is the lowest since 1979 and suggests that the
economy  cannot  experience  rapid  growth  without  inflation  rising
substantially.  Under  those  circumstances,  expansionary  monetary
policy is likely to cause investors to demand an even larger inflation
premium  and to drive  interest rates up, not down.
The role of expectations  is particularly  important. If foreign inves-
tors expect  the dollar will  depreciate in the future, they will be  un-
willing to lend to U.S. borrowers unless the interest rate rises enough
to offset the expected depreciation.  That view implies that an expan-
sionary monetary policy  may temporarily  reduce U.S.  short-run  in-
terest rates, but also will result in a substantial drop in the value of
the dollar. Even advocates of dollar depreciation are unlikely to favor
a free-fall of the dollar, particularly since that would set off further
expectations of a marked increase in U.S. inflation. If expectations  of
lenders conform to this explanation, then a more expansionary mone-
tary policy will be successful  only as part  of a package of steps that
make  an  inflationary  outcome  less  likely,  such as  simultaneously
reducing the U.S. budget deficit.
Consequences  of No  Action
Because none of the alternatives presented above provide a costless
way of reducing the current account deficit,  it is quite possible  that
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final section of this paper is devoted to discussing the consequences
of living with continued capital inflows, a strong dollar and a current
account deficit.
Although the trade deficit has been blamed for the loss of millions
of  jobs in the United States, that judgment simply considers one part
of the economic relationship  discussed above.  Less activity may take
place in sectors that produce traded goods and face more foreign com-
petition,  but the current  account  deficit  means  foreign  investment
enters the United States and creates jobs elsewhere  in the economy.
The  aggregate  influence  on employment  is minor  compared  to the
effects  within particular  sectors of the economy.
Another  way  of thinking  about  this relationship  is to  recall  the
converse  situation debated in the late 60s and early 70s when some
commentators  argued over the number  of jobs lost when the United
States ran a trade surplus and invested abroad. Claims that invest-
ment  abroad  cost  U.S. jobs ignored  the fact  that jobs were  created
by  the  production  necessary  to  generate  a  trade  surplus  in  order
to  buy  foreign  assets.  Again,  the  net  effect  on  employment  was
insignificant.
The thrust of this argument  is that many concerns  about the trade
deficit are  rooted in distributional  issues.  Some  would ask whether
particular  workers or farmers should be expected to pay the price of
an unforeseen shift in U.S. economic policy toward large budget defi-
cits and tight monetary  policy.  Others would ask  whether the per-
sons hurt by these changing circumstances  are  any more  deserving
than those who have found  new opportunities  in an expansion that
has created more jobs in the 1980s than any other market economy
in the world. These are clearly political  questions.
However,  when an economy  is forced to shift rapidly from one type
of activity to another,  with no assurance  that it may  not shift back
again in the future,  a waste  of resources  and loss  of economic  effi-
ciency will result. Establishing  a consistent economic environment is
an important responsibility  of government.
A second  aspect of living with  an  inflow of capital  is to ask how
these resources are being used.  The  United States was a net debtor
nation in the 19th century  and the opening up of the west occurred
with strong British financial participation.  Although  some U.S.  de-
faults  occurred,  in general the United States was  able to use these
resources  productively  enough to pay back foreign  lenders and still
increase national income.
If foreigners  want  to invest in a strong and expanding  U.S.  econ-
omy  now,  or  expect  to  receive  a  real  return  greater  than  what  is
available  elsewhere  in the world, that would  simply appear to be a
potentially  good business decision on their part.
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nomic  policy  choices  even  as  foreigners  are  successful  in earning
high returns from investing here. When newspapers editorialize over
the failure of current U.S. policies that mortgage the future and cost
us our  world  economic  leadership,  they  implicitly  are  making the
judgment  that we  are not making the same productive use  of these
resources that we did in the  19th century. If our current borrowing
does not result in greater productive  capacity, then paying back for-
eigners in the future will mean a smaller share of the same sized pie
is left for Americans.  Under those circumstances,  ignoring the cur-
rent account deficit does impose a burden on our children and grand-
children.
Unfortunately,  our  inability  as  a  society  to  make  decisions  that
might reverse this outlook is a much broader problem than dealing
with international capital flows and requires more than the advice of
an economist to resolve.
REFERENCES
Chambers,  Robert, and Richard Just. "Effects  of Exchange Rate Changes on U.S. Agriculture:  A Dynamic Analy-
sis." Am. J. Agr  Econ. 63(1981):32-46.
Council of Economic Advisers. Economic Report of  the President.  Washington  DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Jan. 1987.
Henneberry, David, Mark Drabenstott, and Shida Henneberry. "A  Weaker Dollar and U.S. Farm Exports: Coming
Rebound  or Empty  Promise." Economic Review,  pp.  22-36. Kansas  City MO:  Federal Reserve  Bank of Kansas
City, May 1987.
91